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NO. 26 JUNE 2020 Introduction 
Friends in Need 
The Corona Pandemic Changes the Landscape of Groups and Coalitions in the EU 
Kai-Olaf Lang and Nicolai von Ondarza 
The corona pandemic and its economic and social consequences are testing EU cohe-
sion as well as the balance of power in the Union. The belated – or lack of – reaction 
by the EU during the crisis has reinforced the national sovereignty of the member 
states and the dominance of the intergovernmental method in moments of crisis. 
One of the palpable consequences has been an alteration in the “North-South divide” 
resulting from a European policy offensive by Spain and Italy, a stronger “southern 
orientation” by France, and a simultaneous crumbling of the “New Hanseatic League”. 
During the corona crisis, institutionalised groups of member states have acted pri-
marily as interest groups that exacerbate differences rather than overcome them. 
Germany, which will assume a special mediating role as the Presidency of the Council 
from 1 July 2020, has to act as a bridge builder. 
 
To contain the corona pandemic and its 
secondary effects, the EU and its member 
states, after a brief period of shock, adopted 
a series of exceptional measures that deeply 
intervene in public life and the economy. 
Through that process, they have exposed – 
and partially shifted – the power structures. 
Divisions in the Union have become visible, 
with some keeping their traditional con-
stellations and others changing markedly. 
Firstly, the crisis has shown that the 
national sovereignty of the member states 
remains intact. Health policy is not an EU 
competence. The initial restrictions to con-
tain the pandemic, therefore, were imposed 
by the nation-states or sometimes, as in 
Germany, the federal states. To date, only 
member states are capable of solidarity in 
the form of providing medical goods such 
as masks or protective clothing. Also, eco-
nomic aid packages initially were mainly 
launched on the national level, whereas 
the EU appeared to be hesitant and only 
temporarily relaxed the rules, for example 
on restrictions for state aid. Dutch vetoes 
against Eurobonds underline once again 
that the EU can only take fundamental 
decisions if all governments agree. 
Step by step, the Commission and the 
Council have partially succeeded in regain-
ing a coordinating role and reinstating 
some of the core facets of the single market. 
But also in the mid- to long-term response 
to the pandemic, the intergovernmental 
institutions, and thus the national govern-
ments, have so far been setting the agenda. 
The central body for the EU’s reaction has 
been the European Council, in which the 
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heads of state and government have thus 
far agreed in four video summits – as far 
as politically possible – on joint action, for 
example on the closure of the EU’s external 
borders, the short-time working allowance 
(SURE), and a new recovery fund. At the 
ministerial level, the Eurogroup was the 
main body negotiating the economic re-
sponse. The European Parliament, on the 
other hand, was only involved to a limited 
extent in the EU’s response to the pan-
demic in making some adjustments to the 
EU budget and approving emergency legis-
lation. Although the EU Commission may 
in the long-term gain new responsibilities, 
such as management of the recovery fund, 
the ground-breaking decisions have been 
taken by the governments in the European 
Council and Council of Ministers. 
New and Old Coalitions 
Given the primacy of member states, “intra-
European diplomacy” in bi- and mini-lateral 
formats has become increasingly important 
for EU decision-making (see SWP Aktuell 
7/2018). Initially, national actions and travel 
restrictions also affected intergovernmental 
formats in the EU. Especially in regional 
groups, the lack of agreement on border 
closures led to the suspension or obstruc-
tion of cross-border cooperation. The dif-
ferent levels of intensity of the epidemic in 
particular countries, the varying number of 
cases, as well as the asynchronous progress 
of the pandemic and distinct containment 
strategies have “split” many established 
groups. However, there has also been a 
revival of various groupings. 
First, the coronavirus pandemic has 
deepened the North-South divide in the EU 
and the Eurozone. Measured by the case 
numbers of officially infected people and 
deaths, Italy, Spain, and France have been 
particularly hard hit. The severity of the 
crisis also applies to the economic impact: 
Due to a combination of severe lockdown 
measures as well as accounting for large 
segments of the tourism and service indus-
tries, southern European countries are also 
estimated to be particularly hard hit eco-
nomically. Different levels of fiscal flexi-
bility have also led to substantially different 
capacities for setting up national economic 
emergency measures. Italy and – above 
all – Spain are on the political offensive in 
looking for more economic and financial 
support from the EU. 
A letter from nine states calling for more 
financial solidarity and the issuance of 
Eurobonds has shown that the traditional 
economic South has expanded, as Ireland, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and Slovenia also 
offered their political support. The Baltic 
states and Slovakia, which in the financial 
crisis were strict opponents of risk-sharing 
and clearly assigned to the “financial North”, 
are at least open to the concerns of the 
nine. Thus, the “New Hanseatic League” 
is also crumbling, at least temporarily. In 
2018, this grouping brought together eight 
small and medium-sized northern Europe-
an states (the Netherlands, Finland, Ireland, 
Denmark, Sweden, and the three Baltic 
states) that, until recently, were united in 
their support for liberal economic policies 
and the further development of the Euro-
zone being based on budgetary discipline. 
A prerequisite for the re-emergence 
of the South was not least the resolution 
of Franco-Italian tensions following the 
change of government in Rome. A bilateral 
summit at the end of February was a strik-
ing expression of the new solidarity. The 
more active role of the Sánchez government 
in European policy also contributed to the 
greater visibility of the South. By contrast, 
the old North has been put on the defensive 
and, apart from the sustained rejection of 
Eurobonds, has in principle accepted the 
need for support. However, the advances 
and simultaneous expansion of the former 
South are primarily being driven by (sup-
posedly) economic necessities and an en-
thusiastic narrative of solidarity. It is note-
worthy that France is not dissociating itself 
from the southern solidarity camp (as Ger-
many did from the Hanseatic group in the 
past), but rather is acting as an integral part 
of it – or even as its spokesperson. Despite 
all this, neither the cohesion nor the asser-
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tiveness of the heterogeneous South can 
be taken for granted. 
In the Visegrád group, there was little 
coordination in fighting the corona crisis. 
Although the heads of government were 
still emphasising their willingness to co-
operate at a summit meeting in early 
March, the borders between the four coun-
tries, for example, were closed without any 
discernible coordination. At the same time, 
however, they still managed to coordinate 
foreign policy priorities in the form of aid 
for the Eastern Partnership and for border 
security and the containment of the corona-
virus in Libya. With regard to negotiations 
on the Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) and the recovery fund, the Visegrád 
countries want to avoid what they consider 
an undue redirection of EU funding from 
eastern to southern member states. How-
ever, differences are visible, with the Czech 
Republic and Hungary arguing heavily 
against the recovery fund in its currently 
proposed shape, and Poland taking a rather 
positive attitude.  
That means that the informal group of 
main beneficiaries of cohesion policies 
which is calling for an “ambitious Europe” 
through an increased EU budget can be 
driven apart. In contrast, the “frugal four” 
(Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, Denmark) 
are insisting on budgetary discipline, even 
after the outbreak of the pandemic. They 
also prefer loans instead of subsidies for 
crisis-stricken countries. But even among 
the four, cohesion is waning, with Sweden 
and Denmark signalling more openness 
to grants as part of the EU recovery fund. 
The BeNeLux Union remains divided on 
economic policy issues, with Belgium and 
Luxembourg in favour of instruments such 
as Eurobonds, but the Netherlands relent-
lessly opposed. The three countries are 
therefore focusing on improving border 
management and creating more transpar-
ency during the crisis. At the suggestion 
of North Rhine-Westphalia, a Cross-Border 
Task Force Corona was set up with the 
Netherlands and Belgium. 
During the crisis, the countries of north-
ern Europe (EU and non-EU countries alike) 
used their tried and tested cooperation 
structures. The affirmation of cooperation 
is also a reaction to Sweden’s special path, 
which has differed from the restrictive 
approaches of other countries in the region 
(and in Europe). In political terms, this 
signals that all countries are sticking to the 
goal of a “green, competitive, and socially 
sustainable Nordic region”. Nevertheless, in 
an usual regional differentiation, Denmark 
opened its borders to Germany and (non-
EU) Norway in June 2020, but not to Sweden. 
In contrast, the Baltic states have established 
a common “travel bubble” to restore the 
flow of people and goods, while continuing 
controls with other EU countries. 
The Weimar Triangle was in a phase of 
cautious reactivation before the outbreak 
of the pandemic. In January, the Secretaries 
of State for Europe met and underlined 
their willingness to revive trilateral consul-
tations. There was improved communica-
tion and even joint initiatives in some areas 
(e.g. the declaration of the three agriculture 
ministers in October 2019; an initiative for 
the reform of competition policy, which 
was supported by Italy). President Macron’s 
visit to Warsaw in February did not bring 
about a breakthrough in the difficult bi-
lateral relations between Poland and France, 
but it opened the door for the first “Weimar 
summit” since 2011. However, due to the 
pandemic, it is by no means certain when 
this summit will take place. 
Hence, the landscape of groups and mini-
lateral cooperation in the EU has changed 
during the pandemic: Financial-economic 
interest groups have come to the fore, 
whereas regional groups have concentrated 
on themselves or been fragmented by bor-
der-related issues and European policy 
questions. Bridge-building formats such as 
Weimar have not been able to provide any 
impetus so far. 
Added Value and Limits of the 
Franco-German Engine 
In the face of these mutually obstructive 
coalitions of interests (and Brexit), “old” 
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mechanisms of the EU are beginning to 
take effect. The initiative presented in mid-
May by Chancellor Merkel and President 
Macron for the “economic recovery of 
Europe after the Corona crisis” bears all 
the hallmarks of a classic Franco-German 
compromise negotiated by the two largest 
EU member states – aiming to unite oppos-
ing groups. The goal is to reach a unani-
mous decision, if possible, for a significantly 
expanded MFF, into which a recovery fund 
is to be integrated (both countries envisaged 
the new fund to consist of €500 billion 
euro; the Commission has proposed to 
boost it up to €750 billion, of which €250 
billion should be provided by loans). 
This Franco-German initiative is a neces-
sary but insufficient step to overcome the 
group conflicts. After all, in an EU of 27 
members, the cohesiveness of the two heavy-
weights is not sufficient to represent all the 
different groups. The Visegrád states, for 
example, see their interests barely reflected 
in Franco-German compromises, and they 
often contradict both Berlin and Paris. On 
the other hand, the “Deauville trauma” still 
affects the Netherlands: Merkel and then-
President Sarkozy of France had confronted 
them with a fait accompli in that north-
western French municipality in 2011, pre-
senting their own resolutions for how to 
proceed in the euro crisis. For The Hague 
this was a reason, along with Brexit, 
to build its own interest groups with the 
“New Hanseatic League”, and later the “fru-
gal four”, in order to oppose, if necessary, 
Franco-German deals. 
Germany and the Groups: 
Consultation and Cooperation 
In the current situation and with its forth-
coming Council Presidency, Germany once 
again has a central role to play in the sta-
bilisation and balancing of the EU. In view 
of increasing and (in part) uncoordinated 
national actions and new as well as old 
polarisations, it is imperative for Germany’s 
European policy to build bridges across 
political divides. The Franco-German initia-
tive of May is a good start, but in the com-
plex group structure of the EU, it needs 
further diplomatic supplements. The fol-
lowing options for “bridge-building” should 
be considered: 
Firstly, Germany should use “plus for-
mats” to enter into dialogue with groups 
to which it does not itself belong. A good 
example is the exchange with the Visegrád 
countries, with which the German govern-
ment held video meetings at the level of 
heads of government immediately after the 
Franco-German summit and at the foreign 
minister level during the crisis. Equally 
important is the dialogue with the “frugal 
four”, especially with the Netherlands, who 
are critical of Franco-German compromises. 
Secondly, Germany should support or 
introduce initiatives that cross existing lines 
of conflict. This applies in particular to the 
issue concerning donors and recipients of 
funds. One possibility would be to revive 
the Ventotene format (Germany, France, 
Italy) or to include Poland in order to sym-
bolically absorb not only North-South, 
but also possible East-West and East-South 
disputes. 
Thirdly, in order to place the predomi-
nance of financial and Eurozone conflicts 
into a broader context, a diverse group of 
economic ministers from large and small 
states could be created. It could deal in-
formally with the economic and industrial 
policy reform processes and with questions 
of modernising the EU (in the style of 
economic Gymnich meetings). 
Dr Kai-Olaf Lang is Senior Fellow in the EU / Europe Division. 
Dr Nicolai von Ondarza is Deputy Head of the EU / Europe Division. 
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